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SEMERENKO v. CENDANT CORP.: THE THIRD CIRCUIT CLARIFIES
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S RULE 10B-5
IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC MISREPRESENTATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934
Act") to protect investors from fraudulent practices in the securities mar-
kets.1 Section l0b 2 and the related Securities Exchange Commission (the
"SEC") Rule 10b-53 accomplish Congress' intent by prohibiting the use of
1. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (citing S. Rep. No. 73-
792, at 1-5 (1934)). "The 1934 Act was designed to protect investors against ma-
nipulation of stock prices."); Randzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148,
155 (1976) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 91 (1975)); ("The primary purpose
of the Securities Exchange Act was... '[t]o provide fair and honest mechanisms
for the pricing of securities [and] to assure that dealing in securities is fair and
without undue preferences or advantages among investors .... '); Blue Chips
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975) (quoting Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.) (describing that 1934 Act was promul-
gated "to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and over-the-counter
markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to
prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for
other purposes"'); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("One of...
[the] central purposes [of the 1934 Act] is to protect investors through the re-
quirement of full disclosure by issuers of securities .... "); see also In reAmes Dep't
Stores, Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 963 (2d Cir. 1993) noting 1934 Act's pur-
pose of protecting investors from fraud); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that "obvious purposes of the Act [are] to protect
the investing public and to secure fair dealing in the securities markets"); Julia K.
Cronin et al., Securities Fraud, 38 Am. CIM. L. REv. 1277, 1278 (2001) (discussing
Congress' efforts "to ensure vigorous market competition by mandating full and
fair disclosure of all material information in the marketplace"); Hal Morris, Note,
Another Day Comes-Misappropriation as an Alternate Basis for Section 10(b) Liability, 61
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 693, 695 (1985) (discussing historical context in which 1934 Act
was promulgated).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section l0b of the 1934 Act reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any.
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange... (b) To use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered.... any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999). SEC Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national security exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
(1171)
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fraudulent schemes, devices, misstatements or omissions "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of a security. 4 The "in connection with" require-
ment defines the nexus litigants must show between the prohibited act
and the purchase or sale of a security in order to pursue an action under
Rule lOb-5. 5
The language of Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 does not attach a fixed
and precise meaning to the "in connection with" requirement. 6 The ma-
jority of Rule lOb-5's jurisprudence construes the "in connection with" re-
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) prohibiting by statute certain statements "in
connection with" purchase or sale of security); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999)
(articulating implementing rule promulgated under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)).
5. See, e.g., Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 789 F.2d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1986) (dis-
missing case for failure to meet Rule 10b-5's "in connection with" requirement and
stating that "[a] ny fraud that may have occurred in the reinvestment of [the] funds
... was merely incidental to the sale of [the] securities and, therefore, was not 'in
connection with' the sale of a security to bring it within the protective ambit of
Rule 10b-5"); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. C. & F. Brokerage Servs., 751 F. Supp. 436, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing plaintiffs' Rule 10b-5 claim for "fail[ure] to allege the
requisite 'connection' with "the purchase or sale' of a security"); see also Barbara
Black, The Second Circuit's Approach to the "In Connection With" Requirement of Rule lOb-
5, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 539, 541 (1987) (discussing dismissal of actions under 10b-5
for failure to meet rule's "in connection with" requirement); C. Edward Fletcher,
III, The "In Connection With" Requirement of Rule lOb-5, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 913, 915-16,
22 (1998) (likening "in connection with" requirement to that of "linchpin" be-
tween fraudulent act and sale or purchase of security and delineating importance
of "in connection with" requirement as threshold requirement to stating cause of
action under Rule 10b-5).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (providing language of statute); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1999) (providing language of SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated under 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)). The expansive amount of case law struggling to interpret
the seemingly straightforward "in connection with" requirement brings to light the
ambiguity present in the rule's construction. See In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc.
Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 964-69 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing evolution of case law
regarding 10b-5's "in connection with" requirement and recognizing that confu-
sion evidenced within case law is in part caused by numerous factual situations
under which Rule lOb-5 actions arise); see also Fletcher, supra note 5, at 929 (dis-
cussing confusion prominent in case law and contributing such confusion to "the
explosive growth of 10b-5 to cover vastly different types of transactions"); Fran-
cesca Muratori, The Boundaries of the "In Connection With" Requirement of Rule 10b-5:
Should Advertising Be Actionable as Securities Fraud?, 56 Bus. LAw. 1057, 1057-58
(2001) (noting judicial uncertainty in area of Rule 10b-5).
There is an on-going debate, however, as to the drafter's reasoning for
promulgating such an ambiguous and seemingly expansive rule. Compare Fletcher,
supra note 5, at 915 ("The rule is drafted in a manner seemingly calculated to
produce disputes over its interpretation; if that is what the drafters intended, their
wishes have been long fulfilled."), with Muratori, supra, at 1057 (discussing belief
that drafters never intended rule to be subject of such judicial uncertainty).
1172
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quirement broadly, as to insure the protection of investors. 7 Conversely,
some scholars endorse a narrower reading of the "in connection with" re-
quirement, as to insure that the floodgates to Rule lOb-5 litigation are not
opened. 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently re-
considered the contours of Rule lOb-5's "in connection with" require-
ment.9 In Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 10 the court applied a broad "material
and public dissemination" approach to the Rule." Under this approach,
the Third Circuit held that the fraud alleged need only be "disseminated
to the public in a medium upon which a reasonable investor would rely,
and... material when disseminated."' 2 Some commentators suggest that
this broad approach demonstrates a departure from the circuit's prior "in
connection with"jurisprudence. 13 To what extent the Third Circuit aban-
doned its prior precedent is, however, debatable given that the Semerenko
court limited its holding to situations where the alleged fraud concerns
public misrepresentations. 14
This Casebrief reviews the Third Circuit's interpretation of Rule 10b-
5's "in connection with" requirement. Part II provides a general examina-
7. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 821 (8th ed. 2000) (discussing that minimal nexus
between violation of Rule lOb-5 and purchase or sale of security is needed but
noting that courts interpret "in connection with" requirement broadly); see also
Muratori, supra note 6, at 1057-58 (discussing fact that broad interpretation is ad-
vocated by many commentators). For a further discussion of the broad interpreta-
tion of Rule lOb-5's "in connection with" requirement, see infra notes 74-85 and
accompanying text.
8. See Muratori, supra note 6, at 1058 ("[Some scholars counter the broad
approach insisting that] under an amorphous reading-one that invariably invites
class action abuses-public companies face an indiscernible boundary between
what does and does not violate the prohibition."); see alsoJoseph M. McLaughlin,
Understanding Directors' and Officers'Liability, N.Y. L.J. Sept. 26, 2000, at 1 (advocat-
ing narrow "investment value" approach for determining contours of "in connec-
tion with" requirement). For a further discussion of the narrow approaches, see
infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
9. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176-80 (3d Cir. 2000) (de-
fining contours of "in connection with" requirement and remanding to lower
court to decide whether plaintiffs met Rule 10b-5's "in connection with" require-
ment in light of defined contours).
10. 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000).
11. See id. at 176 (adopting and defining materiality and public dissemination
approach).
12. Id.
13. See Shannon P. Duffy, New Rule on Shareholder Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J., July 3,
2000, at B5 (suggesting that Semerenko announced "new rule on shareholder law-
suits); McLaughlin, supra note 8, at I (suggesting that Semerenko decision "dispelled
much of the confusion in its jurisdiction").
14. See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176 ("We conclude that the materiality and pub-
lic dissemination approach should apply in this case.") (emphasis added). The
court further noted that, "[i]n light of the law of this circuit.., the scope of the 'in
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tion of Section l0b and Rule lOb-5 focusing on the evolution of the statute
and the rule's "in connection with" requirement.' 5 Part III analyzes the
Third Circuit's interpretation of Rule lOb-5 as developed prior to Semer-
enko.16 This discussion provides the backdrop for Part III's detailed discus-
sion of the Third Circuit's Semerenko decision. 17 Finally, Part TV discusses
the implications of Semerenko on the circuit's "in connection with" jurispru-
dence. 18 This section concludes with advice for practitioners to consider
when confronted with an "in connection with" issue. 19
II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF SECTION 10B AND RULE 1OB-5's
"IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT
In response to fraudulent and deceptive practices in the securities
market, Congress enacted the 1934 Act.20 Section 10b of the 1934 Act is
the Act's general anti-fraud provision. 2 ' The statute, however, is not self-
executing. Section 10b, by its terms, requires the SEC to prescribe imple-
menting rules. 22 To implement the statute, the SEC promulgated Rule
lOb-5. 23 Rule lOb-5, in turn, deems it unlawful to use any fraudulent
scheme, device, misstatement or omission "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of a security. 24 Rule lOb-5 is the "cornerstone" of the
security law's antifraud provisions. 25 The activities prohibited by the rule
include: (1) activities involving a corporation's issuance of misleading in-
15. For a further discussion of Section 10b and the evolution of Rule 10b-5's
"in connection with" requirement, see infra notes 21-65 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of Rule 10b-5
as developed prior to Semerenko, see infra notes 86-110 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
Semerenko, see infra notes 111-47 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the implications of Semerenko on the circuit's
"in connection with" jurisprudence, see infra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion regarding advice for practitioners to consider
when confronted with an "in connection with" issue, see infra notes 148-64 and
accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of Congress' purpose in enacting the 1934 Act,
see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
21. See Scott J. Davis, Liability Under Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, in UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAw 729 (2000) (discussing
Rule 10b-5's purpose in 1934 Act).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (prohibiting use of "any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors") (emphasis added).
23. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999) (providing for implementation of 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)).
24. See id. (providing language of Rule 10b-5).
25. See Morris, supra note 1, at 695 (citing.Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 as 1934
Act's "primary anti-fraud provisions" and "cornerstones of the SEC's enforcement
program to combat fraudulent trading"); see also SODERQUIST & GABALDON, SECURI-
TIES LAw 135 (1998) (discussing development of Section lOb and Rule IOb-5 since
their respective enactment and noting that over time Rule lOb-5 "clearly occupies
the preeminent position among the antifraud provisions in the securities laws").
1174 [Vol. 47: p. 1171
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formation to the public;26 (2) a corporation's silence despite a duty to
disclose; 27 (3) tipping;2 8 (4) insider trading;29 and (5) market manipula-
tion and certain other forms of conduct in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security.
30
A. The Elements and Defenses of the Rule lOb-5 Private Cause of Action
Rule lOb-5 provides no express private right of action.3 1 Beginning
with the 1946 case of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,3 2 however, the lower
courts have found that an implied right of action exists under the Rule.
33
To state a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must show
six elements.3 4 First, the plaintiffs must show that a defendant made a
26. See, e.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176-80 (3d Cir. 2000)
(determining contours of "in connection with" requirement in case concerning
public misrepresentations); McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 392-93 (9th
Cir. 1996) (same); In reAmes Dep't Stores, Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 965 (2d
Cir. 1993) (same); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-54 (2d Cir.
1968) (adding "reasonably certain" test into judicial vernacular); In re Leslie Fay
Cos. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686, 697-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (determining contours of
"in connection with" requirement in case concerning public misrepresentations).
27. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (discussing
Rule 10b-5 liability based on corporation's silence despite duty to disclose and not-
ing that "[t]o be actionable, of course, a statement must also be misleading. Si-
lence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5").
28. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 312-
15 (1985) (discussing "tippee-tipper" liability in case involving insider trading).
29. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 642 (1997) (citing
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980) (defining insider trading)).
The Court in O'Hagan found that:
Under the 'traditional' or 'classical theory' of insider trading liability, a
violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 occurs when a corporate insider
trades in his corporation's securities on the basis of material, confidential
information he has obtained by reason of his position. Such trading quali-
fies as a 'deceptive device' because there is a relationship of trust and
confidence between the corporation's shareholders and the insider that
gives rise to a duty to disclose or abstain from trading.
O'Hagan at 642; see also SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 25, at 135 (listing
activities most commonly litigated under Rule 10b-5 and noting that insider trad-
ing is rule's best known use).
30. See, e.g., Corsair Capital Partners, L.P. v. Wedbush Morgan Sec., Inc., No.
00-56397, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27117, at *5 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2001) (noting that
"market manipulation carries with it liability under Rule 10b-5" and remanding
case to lower court to decide issue of market manipulation); GFL Advantage Fund,
Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 207 (3d Cir. 2001) (dismissing Rule 10b-5 complaint
for failure to state claim of securities fraud and market manipulation).
31. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999) (providing no private cause of action).
32. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946):
33. See id. at 513-15 (finding implied right of action under Section 10b); see
also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (confirming
private right of action under Section 10b).
34. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1997)) (discussing elements
necessary to state claim under Rule 10b-5).
5
Maloney: Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.: The Third Circuit Clarifies the Secur
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
misrepresentative or fraudulent statement. 35 Second, a plaintiff must
show that the statement was material. 36 Third, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant acted with scienter.37 Fourth, the defendant must have
made the statement in question "in connection with" the purchase or sale
of a security.38 Fifth, a plaintiff'must show that it relied upon the misrep-
resentative or fraudulent statement.3 9 Sixth, a plaintiff must show that
such reliance led to its injury.40
B. The Evolution of Rule l Ob-5's "In Connection With " Requirenent
Since the Kardon court's implied finding of a private cause of action,
interpretation of Rule 10b-5's "in connection with" requirement has un-
dergone considerable transformation. 4' Beginning in the 1960s, use of
Rule 10b-5 as a private cause of action flourished, reaching its "heyday" in
the mid-1970s.4 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit's 1968 decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,43 followed in 1971 by
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Superintendent of Insurance of
the State of N.Y v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,44 spurred Rule 1Ob-5 litiga-
tion by expanding the scope of the "in connection with requirement."45
In Texas Gulf, the Second Circuit found that Texas Gulf Sulphur's
misleading press releases were "in connection with" the sale of a security. 46
35. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (defining manip-
ulative as "virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets.
It connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors
by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities").
36. See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176 (discussing materiality requirement).
37. See id. at 193 (granting certiorari to resolve question of "whether a private
cause of action for damages will lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of
any allegation of 'scienter' - intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" and con-
cluding that there is no action under such facts).
38. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-14
(1971) (discussing "in connection with" requirement).
39. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-47 (1988) (discussing reliance
requirement).
40. See id. at (discussing interaction between reliance and injury element of
Rule 10b-5).
41. See In reAmes Dep't Stores, Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 964-65 (2d Cir.
1993) (discussing evolution of case law regarding "in connection with"
requirement).
42. See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 25, at 135 (discussing history of
Rule 1Ob-5 and noting that after Kardon decision until 1960s, "use of the rule grew
slowly"); see also Fletcher, supra note 5, at 927 (labeling early 1970s as "heyday" of
Rule lOb-5 litigation).
43. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
44. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
45. See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 25, at 135 (noting Texas Gulfs
role in expanding use of Rule lOb-5). For a further discussion of Texas Guf, infra
notes 42, 46-48 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Bankers Life, see
infra notes 43, 49-51 and accompanying text.
46. See Tex. Gulf 401 F.2d at 860-62 (interpreting contours of "in connection
with" requirement and applying contours to facts of case).
1176 [Vol. 47: p. 1171
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In so concluding, the Second Circuit introduced the "reasonably calcu-
lated" standard into judicial vernacular.4 7 This standard holds that the "in
connection with" requirement is met "whenever assertions are made ... in
a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public ...if
such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead
"48
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court issued its only decision
speaking directly to the "in connection with" requirement.49 In Bankers
Life, the Court concluded that Section 10b's "in connection with" require-
ment is to be read broadly. 50 In so concluding, the Supreme Court held
that the "in connection with" requirement is met when the deceptive prac-
tices, here a fraudulent bond selling and fund misappropriation scheme,
"touch" the sale or purchase of a security. 5 1
Bankers Life's ambiguously stated "touch' test sent a clear signal to the
lower courts that the "in connection with" requirement was to be read
broadly.5 2 The courts seized upon this signal and consistently read the
"touch" test as a de minimis requirement. 53 In the mid-1970s, however,
the trend towards expanding the "in connection with" requirement was
thwarted when the United States Supreme Court issued three opinions
47. See id. at (introducing "reasonably certain" concept).
48. Id. at 862.
49. See Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12 (defining contours of "in connection with"
requirement broadly); see also Muratori, supra note 6, at 1060 (citing Bankers Life as
United States Supreme Court's only opinion specifically regarding "in connection
with" requirement).
50. See Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 11-12 (requiring broad reading of Rule 10b-5
to insure that "novel" and "atypical," as well as standard and straightforward fraud
would fall under scope of Section 10b and Rule 10b-5).
51. See id. at 12-13 (holding that corporation "suffered an injury as a result of
deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor," and therefore,
deceptive practices .were "in connection with" sale of securities).
52. See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 25, at 136 ("The looseness of the
'touching' formulation, and the almost summary way in which the Supreme Court
disposed of the case, seemed to send a clear signal to lower courts that they were to
continue to interpret [R]ule 10b-5 expansively."); Fletcher, supra note 5, at 926
("Most commentators agree that the almost cavalier way in which the Bankers Life
Court reached its holding indicates a shift toward a more expansive reading of the
'in connection with requirement ....').
53. See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1026 (3d Cir. 1977) (discussing im-
plications of Bankers Life decision). The court stated that:
Subsequent to Bankers Life, federal tribunals have tended to construe
the "in connection with" element of 10(b) broadly. Such courts have fo-
cused on the language in the Bankers Life opinion which suggests that
the protection of the statute is available when there are "deceptive prac-
tices touching [the] sale [or purchase] of securities ...." Almost without
exception, they have found compliance with the "connection" require-
ment even where fraudulent conduct is implicated only tangentially in a
securities transaction.
Id. at 1026 (citingJannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 461 F.2d 525, 529
(7th Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted); see also Fletcher, supra note 5, at 926 (finding
that many courts read "touch" test as de minimis requirement).
2002] 1177'CASEBRIEF
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narrowing the scope of the "touch" test.54 The most signifigant of these
opinions regarding the "in connection with" requirement was Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.
55
In Blue Chip Stamps, the United States Supreme Court was asked to
extend Rule lOb-5's "in connection with" requirement to fraudulent or
misrepresentative statements in connection with offers.5 6 Here, the plain-
tiffs refused to purchase stock in Blue Chip Stamps alleging that Blue Chip
Stamps "fraudulently and pessimistically misrepresented its financial con-
dition." 57 The Court, however, refused to apply Rule 10b-5 to the defend-
ants' action even though there was an allegation of misrepresentation by
Blue Chip Stamps and there was no question that Blue Chip Stamps sold
securities. 58 The Court instead held that under Section 10b, only a person
who has actually purchased or sold stock has standing to bring a private
action. 59
Commentators agree that the Blue Chip Stamps line of cases decided by
the United States Supreme Court in the mid-1970s implicitly rejected the
Bankers Life de minimis "touch" test by making it clear that "the 'in connec-
tion with' requirement requires more touching than simply a light ca-
ress." 60 As one commentator notes, "[t]he relatively narrow reading...
the Supreme Court gave ... to the 10b-5 ... cause of action permits lower
courts, in close cases, to decide that the 'touching test' is not met."6 1 The
various courts of appeals, in turn, have seized upon the opportunity to
limit the overreaching breadth of the "touch" test in cases concerning less
54. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (determining
requirements of Rule lOb-5 are not met when conduct at issue is neither manipula-
tive nor deceptive and that proposed merger did not involve either manipulation
or deception); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 US. 185, 193 (1976) (granting
certiorari to resolve question of "whether a private cause of action for damages will
lie under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 in the absence of any allegation of 'scienter'-
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" and concluding that action will not lie
and thereby adding scienter requirement to Rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975) (holding that only actual purchas-
ers or sellers of securities have standing to bring action under Rule lOb-5).
55. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 754-55 (holding that only actual purchas-
ers or seller of securities have standing to bring action under Rule lOb-5).
56. See id. at 725-26 (discussing issue before Court).
57. See id. at (discussing plaintiffs' allegations).
58. See id. at (discussing plaintiffs' allegations).
59. See id. at 727, 754-55 (basing decision on policy concerns).
60. See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 927-28 (noting that Court rejected lOb-5 ar-
gument notwithstanding fact that there were allegations of misrepresentations and
securities involved and thereby rejected any de minimis "touch" test); see also
SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 25, at 136 (noting that after Bankers Life,
lower court interpreted Rule lOb-5 expansively until Supreme Court sent contrary
signals in Blue Chips Stamps).
61. Fletcher, supra note 5, at 927 (quoting A. JAcoBs, LITIGATION AND PRAC-
TICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 (2d ed. 1981)).
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than straightforward fraud. 62 Various views of the "in connection with"
requirement subsequently have emerged.
6 3
C. Approaches Circuit Courts Employ in Attempting to Define the Contours of
the "In Connection With" Requirement
The predominant approaches the circuit courts employ in attempting
to define the contours of Rule lOb-5's "in connection with" requirement
are divided into two broad categories. These categories are Rule lOb-5
violations involving "relatively private" [misrepresentations] ... made by
defendants to individual plaintiffs" ("private misrepresentations") and
Rule lOb-5 violations made to the. public at large ("public misrepre-
sentations") .64
1. Private Misrepresentations
Private misrepresentations are misrepresentations made by defend-
ants to individual plaintiffs.6 5 For example, a misrepresentation made by
a brokerage house to a customer would constitute a private misrepresenta-
tion. 66 In "private transaction" cases, the circuit courts primarily employ
62. See, e.g., Head v. Head, 759 F.2d 1172, 1175 (4th Cir. 1985) (seizing op-
portunity to redefine Bankers Life "touch" test in adopting "investment value" ap-
proach). In Head v. Head, the court reinterpreted the meaning of Bankers Life and
stated:
The Bankers Life "de minimis touch test" might be read literally and ex-
pansively to make any securities transaction actionable under Rule 10b-5
so long as there was some deceptive practice remotely "touching" the
transaction. But we think the test could not have been intended to be
applied in so unlimited a way.
Id. at 1175; see Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1027 (3d Cir. 1977) (suggesting
inadequacy of Bankers Life "touch" test and noting early trend to narrow breadth of
test). For a discussion of the "investment value" approach adopted in Head, see
infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
Ketchum serves as an early example of the trend towards narrowing the overly
broad scope of Bankers Life's "touch" test. See id. at 1023-24 (adopting causation
limitation). In Ketchum the court noted this early trend stating that, "[e]ven
though the federal courts, by and large, have not felt compelled to engage in a
searching exegesis respecting the 'connection' facet of § 10(b), a few judges have
recognized that the teachings of Bankers Life are hardly refined or capable of
facile application." Id. at 1027; see also Muratori, supra note 6, at 1061 (discussing
lower courts "desire for more precision than the 'touch' test offers"). The courts
desire this precision because of the "serious impact of a finding that the federal
securities laws apply to particular behavior." Id. at 1061.
63. For a further discussion of various views, see infra notes 64-85 and accom-
panying text.
64. See Robert A. Prentice, Locating That "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent"
Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section lOb, 75 N.C. L. REv. 691,
779 n.401 (1997) (consolidating different courts' approaches regarding "in con-
nection with" requirement).
65. See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 1 (providing example of private
transaction).
66. See Peter v. Letsou, The Scope of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 95, 110 (1996) (defining "private transac-
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three approaches in defining the contours of the "in connection with"
requirement. 67 These approaches are "the value of the security approach"
or the "investment value approach," "the causation approach," and the
Bankers Life "touch" test approach. 68
The narrowest view of the "in connection with" requirement finds
that the requirement is satisfied only when the fraud or misrepresentation
affects the underlying value of the security. 69 This approach implicates
statements concerning the value of the security, the quality of the security
itself, the quality of the issuer, and other "attributes of ownership" that
would influence a reasonable investor's decision regarding whether to buy
or sell the security.7 0 The Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits have ar-
ticulated this view when the alleged fraud takes place in the context of a
private transaction. 71
tions" as generally consisting of "direct sales of securities to a limited number of
knowledgeable investors . . . [and] typically characterized by direct negotiations
between purchasers and sellers").
67. See Muratori, supra note 6, at 1061-62 (discussing various tests); see also
Prentice, supra note 64, at 779 n.401 (discussing different approaches and rating
approaches on scale of most stringent to most liberal).
68. See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 1 (naming various tests); see also Prentice,
supra note 64, at 779 n.401 (discussing different approaches and rating approaches
on scale of most stringent to most liberal).
69. See Prentice, supra note 64, at 779 n.401 (finding that "investment value"
approach is narrowest view taken in defining contours of "in connection with" re-
quirement); see also McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 1 (advocating "investment value"
approach); Muratori, supra note 6, at 1061 (discussing "investment value"
approach).
70. See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 1 (discussing situations in which "invest-
ment value" approach applies).
71. See Gurwara v. Lyphomed Inc., 937 F.2d 380, 382 (7th Cir. 1991) (adopt-
ing "investment value" approach and dismissing action because misrepresentation
was unrelated to value of involved security or consideration offered for security);
Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 789 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1986) (dismissing Rule
10b-5 complaint because private party "did not allege that appellees misled him
concerning the value of the securities he sold or the consideration he received in
return"); Head v. Head, 759 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (4th Cir. 1985) (adopting "invest-
ment value" approach and precluding liability due to fact that alleged misrepre-
sentations did not relate to underlying value of security); Chemical Bank v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir. 1984) (dismissing IOb-5 action brought
by creditors because there had been no misrepresentation as to value of pledged
collateral and further noting "[t]he Act and Rule impose liability for a proscribed
act in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; it is not sufficient to allege
that a defendant has committed a proscribed act in a transaction of which the
pledge of a security is a part").
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also looked to
the "investment value" approach in defining the contours of the "in connection
with" requirement. See Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939,
944-45 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing and broadening scope of "investment value" ap-
proach). In so doing, the Third Circuit has broadened the narrow interpretation
to include "misrepresentations beyond those implicating the investment value of a
particular security," specifically, misrepresentations implicating the broader course
of securities. See id. at 942 (discussing reasoning for holding in case). For a fur-
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The nexus/causation approach, the predominant approach for both
the Third and Fifth Circuits, is slightly more liberal than the value of the
securities approach. 7 2 This approach requires a sufficient "nexus" be-
tween the fraudulent misrepresentation and the investment decision so
that the investment decision can be attributed to the misrepresentation. 73
This approach is based on a consideration of whether the policy of "foster-
ing investment activity without fear of fraud or deceit" underlying Section
10b and Rule lOb-5, is advanced by applying the rule to the fraudulent
transaction at issue.74
The Bankers Life "touch" test is the most "pro-plaintiff' approach. 75
Courts employing the Banker Life "touch" test rely on the United States
Supreme Court's direction that Section 10b's "in connection with" re-
quirement is to be read broadly and read the "touch" test as a de minimis
requirement. 76 Most courts agree, however, that "[t]he 'in connection
with' requirement will not support a Rule lOb-5 action for simply any
wrongdoing that just happens to involve securities. " v7 Therefore, reliance
on Bankers Life has, in recent years, greatly diminished. 78
2. Public Misrepresentations
The second general approach concerns situations where the misrep-
resentations are "relatively public ... and made by defendants to the mar-
ket at large." 79 Unlike the division of approaches found in private
misrepresentations, the lower courts ordinarily treat cases involving public
ther discussion of Angelastro's approach, see infra notes 104-110 and accompanying
text.
72. See Brown v. Ivie, 661 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1981) (acknowledging need for
causation and stating that "accepting the fraud as alleged, there is a direct connec-
tion between it and the execution of the.., agreement obligating [the plaintiff] to
sell his stock for less than fair value"); Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1027-29
(3d Cir. 1977) (adding causation requirement to Bankers Life "touch" test); see also
Prentice, supra note 64, at 779 n.401 (defining "causation" approach as slightly
more liberal).
73. See Muratori, supra note 6, at 1061-62 (discussing nexus required by courts
employing "causation" approach).
74. See id. (discussing policy considerations underlying "causation"
approach).
75. See Prentice, supra note 64, at 779 n.401 (citing "touch" test derived from
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971), as most
"pro-plaintiff" approach).
76. See Bankers Life at 11-12 (requiring broad reading of Rule lOb-5 to insure
that "novel" and "atypical," as well as standard and straightforward fraud fall under
scope of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5); see alsoJannes v. Microwave Communica-
tions, Inc., 461 F.2d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 1972) (citing Bankers Life's de minimis
"touch" test); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 736-38 (2d Cir. 1971) (same).
77. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION,
VOLUME 1I 472 (3d ed. 1995).
78. See id. (stating that "[I]t has thus been held that a de minimis 'touch' test
is not sufficient to satisfy the 'in connection with' requirement").
79. Prentice, supra note 64, at 779 n.401.
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misrepresentations in a consistent manner. 80 In such cases, courts gener-
ally adopt the Texas Gulf"reasonably calculated" standard holding that the
"'in connection with' requirement is met when the affirmative misrepre-
sentations are made in a setting reasonably calculated or reasonably ex-
pected to influence the investing public."
8 1
As evidenced by the brief overview of circuit court approaches, there
is not a universal approach for determining when the "in connection with"
requirement is satisfied nor is one possible. 8 2 The "in connection with"
determination is highly fact sensitive and therefore must be made on a
case-by-case basis.8 3 Although the aforementioned approaches are consid-
ered the dominant approaches of the noted circuits, they are not the ex-
clusive approaches. 8 4 Rather, when the facts of the case necessitate, the
lower courts indicate a readiness to rely on an "in connection with" ap-
proach different than one on which the circuit previously relied.8 5 The
80. See In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 966 (2d Cir.
1993) (contributing consistency threading throughout public misrepresentation
cases to situations of blatant and straightforward fraud found in such cases and
minimal analytical difficulties such fraud presents to courts); see also Prentice, supra
note 64, at 779 n.401 (finding consistency in lower courts' interpretations of "in
connection with" requirement when fraud alleged includes dissemination of infor-
mation to public at large).
81. Prentice, supra note 64, at 779 n.401 (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d
165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopting Texas Guf "reasonably calculated" standard in
case of public misrepresentation); McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 392-93
(9th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Ames, 991 F.2d at 965 (same); In re Leslie Fay Co., Inc.
Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686, 697-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same).
82. See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 929 ("The doctrinally diffuse nature of lOb-5
makes it impossible to establish common principles for universal application of the
'in connection with' requirement.").
83. See Semerenko, 223.F.3d at 174 (noting law of circuit that scope of "in con-
nection with" requirement must be determined on case-by-case basis); In re Ames,
991 F.2d at 962 (quoting Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930 (2d
Cir. 1984) ("In cases near the borderline, courts have warned that 'it is important
that the standard be fleshed out by a cautious case-by-case approach'...."); see also
Muratori, supra note 6, at 1060 ("Because of the ambiguity of the 'touch' test,
courts widely claim that the sufficiency of the 'in connection with' nexus must be
made on a case-by-case basis.") (footnote omitted).
84. Compare In re Ames, 789 F.2d at 962 (adopting Texas Gulfs "reasonably cal-
culated" approach), with Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc. 789 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.
1986) (adopting "investment value" approach). For a discussion of the Second
Circuit's reasoning for using varying approaches, see infra note 84 and accompany-
ing text.
85. See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 1 (noting how Second Circuit Court of
Appeals applies "investment value" approach to private misrepresentations and
Texas Gulfs "reasonably calculated" approach to cases concerning public misrepre-
sentations). The Second Circuit's varying approaches are attributable to the fact
that cases of public misrepresentation are often considered cases of typical,
straightforward fraud. See In re Ames, 991 F.2d at 963 (considering fraud related to
press releases issued to public as straightforward case of fraud). Unlike cases of
"atypical fraud," cases of straightforward fraud pose minimal analytical difficulties.
See id. at 966 (comparing analytical difficulties found in cases of atypical fraud,
such as private misrepresentations "in which the defendants tricked the plaintiffs
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history and present state of the "in connection with" requirement in the
Third Circuit provides one such example.8 6
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS' APPROACH TO THE
"IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT
A. Third Circuit Precedent Prior to Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.
The Third Circuit's modem day "in connection with" jurisprudence
dates back to the 1971 case Gottlieb v. Sandia American Corp.87 Gottlieb con-
cerned the nondisclosure of information to shareholders regarding an as-
set acquisition.8 8 On review, the Third Circuit Court found "a sufficient
nexus between the [nondisclosure of information to the shareholders]
and the purchase" to meet the statutory test of Section l0b and Rule 10b-
5.89 In so doing, the court adopted the "reasonably calculated" standard
articulated in Texas Guf 90
Shortly after the Gottlieb decision, however, the United States Su-
preme Court decided Bankers Life.9' Thereafter, the Third Circuit seem-
into parting with their securities for no consideration at all" to minimal analytical
difficulties found in cases in which "defendants are accused of defrauding the
plaintiffs by misleading the general public as to the market value of securities they
had issued").
86. For a discussion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' fact based ap-
proach to the "in connection with" requirement, see infra notes 110 and accompa-
nying text.
87. 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1971).
88. See Gottlieb 452 F.2d at 515 (discussing omission of material fact in finan-
cial statement). In Gottlieb, the plaintiffs, stock and debenture holders of a corpo-
ration, were the target of a merger by Sandia American Corporation. See id.
(discussing facts of case). The plaintiffs alleged that Sandia American's indebted-
ness for a large sum of money to a third party was not reflected in the financial
statement that Sandia American provided the plaintiffs during the negotiations
nor otherwise communicated to them prior to the consummation of the agree-
ment. See, id. (discussing plaintiffs' allegations). The plaintiffs alleged such with-
holding of information was a misrepresentation of the true value of Sandia
American's stock at the time plaintiffs agreed to take it in exchange for their hold-
ings in the acquired corporation. See id. (discussing plaintiffs' allegations). The
defendants, however, argued that the plaintiffs did not rely on the financial state-
ments and, therefore, could not pursue litigation under Rule 10b-5. See id. (dis-
cussing one prong of defendants' defense).
89. See id. at 515-16 (discussing first lower court's finding that statements con-
stituted actionable misrepresentations and further affirming lower court's finding
that actionable misrepresentations were "in connection with" sale of Sandia Ameri-
can's stock).
90. See id. at 516 (quoting and adopting standard articulated in Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.). For a further discussion of Texas Guf, see supra notes 48-50 and ac-
companying text.
91. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971) (deciding cdntours of "in connection with" requirement in November of
1971, 8 months after Gottlieb was decided). The Gottlieb decision does not conform
with any of the aforementioned approaches. This is due to the fact that the afore-
mentioned approaches are all derivatives of the Bankers Life "touch" test. For a
discussion of the approaches seeking to narrow the Bankers Life "touch" test, see
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ingly abandoned Texas Gulfs "reasonably calculated" standard, citing
instead the Bankers Life "touch" test.9 2 In the wake of Blue Chip Stamps, the
Third Circuit qualified the "touch" test in adopting the causation
approach. 93
1. The Causation Approach: Ketchum v. Green
In Ketchum v. Green,94 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that in
order to meet Rule 10b-5's "in connection with" requirement there must
be a certain degree of proximity between the securities transaction and
the claimed fraud.95 In Ketchum, the defendants, directors and officers of
a close corporation, allegedly conspired to remove from office the plain-
tiffs, two officers of the corporation, employees and shareholders. 9 6
Under the corporation's stock retirement agreement, the removed and
terminated plaintiffs were forced to resell their stock to the corporation.9 7
The plaintiffs, however, alleged that the price of the forced redemption
was inadequate and subsequently brought action under Rule lOb-5 on the
theory that they were forced to tender their shares as a result of the de-
fendants' fraudulent scheme. 98
On review, the major issue before the Third Circuit was whether the
alleged misrepresentations were made "in connection with" the subse-
supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. Gottlieb is instrumental, however, as it
cited as the case in which the Third Circuit adopted the Texas Gulf"reasonably
calculated" standard. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 n.5 (3d
Cir. 2000) ("This court has adopted the standards articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. for determining whether the statutory requirements of [Section] l0b and Rule
lOb-5 are satisfied.") (citing Gottlieb v. Sandia American Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 515-16
(3d Cir. 1971)).
92. See, e.g., Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944-45
(3d Cir. 1985) (discussing "in connection with" requirement and basing decision
on qualified version of Bankers Life "touch" test); Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022,
1027-29 (3d Cir. 1977) (defining contours of "in connection with" requirement
and comparing factual situation at issue to that of Bankers Life).
93. See Ketchum, 557 F.2d at 1027-29 (adding causation element to "touch"
test). For a further discussion of Ketchum, see infra notes 93-103 and accompanying
text; see also Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 944-45 (citing Ketchum and adopting altered
version of "value-based" approach). For a further discussion of Angelastro, see infra
notes 104-10 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Blue Chip Stamps
and its impact on the contours of the Bankers Life de minimis "touch" test, see supra
notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
94. 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1977).
95. See id. at 1023 (specifying that court must "ascertain whether the factual
matrix... satisfies the 'in connection with' clause of [Section] 10b... [and] Rule
lOb-5 - a clause which requires for a cause of action that a misrepresentation be
rendered in connection with a sale or purchase of a security").
96. See id. at 1023-24 (discussing facts of case).
97. See id. at 1023-25 (discussing company's stock retirement agreement
under which former employees were required to sell their stock back to corpora-
tion at price determined by corporation).
98. See id. at 1023-24 (discussing plaintiffs' theory for cause of action).
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quent forced redemption of the plaintiffs' stock.9 9 In distinguishing the
situation put forth in Ketchum to that of Bankers Life, the court found that
unlike Bankers Life, where the deception was only one step away from a
securities deal, the deception in Ketchum was too far removed from the
ultimate redemption of the stock.10 0 The court emphasized that interven-
ing between the deception and the redemption of stock were numerous
events including the shareholders' vote and a subsequent meeting remov-
ing plaintiffs as officers and employees. 10 1
As such, the court determined that the degree of proximity was much
more attenuated than the degree of connection in Bankers Life.102 Based
on this determination the court held that the "in connection with" re-
quirement was not met. 10 3 Ketchum therefore narrowed the Bankers Lfe
"touch" test by explicitly requiring a causal connection between the
claimed fraud and the purchase or sale of the security. 10 4
2. Finding an Exception to the Investment Value Approach: Angelastro v.
Prudential-Bache Securities Inc.
In Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Security Inc.,' 0 5 the, Third Circuit con-
sidered whether "alleged misrepresentations and nondisclosures by a bro-
kerage firm regarding the credit terms of a margin account [fell] within
the ambit of Section 10b" and Rule lOb-5.10 6 On appeal, the main source
of dispute between the parties was whether alleged misrepresentations not
relating to the merits of a particular security but instead relating to a
broader course of dealing in securities satisfied Rule lOb-5's "in connection
with" requirement.
10 7
99. See id. at 1023 (discussing issue on review).
100. See id. at 1028 (distinguishing situation present in Ketchum from Bankers
Life).
101. See id. at 1028 (discussing intervening events and finding that alleged
misrepresentations and events leading to forced redemption of stock, here, adop-
tion of resolution terminating plaintiffs' status as company employees, were much
farther removed than misrepresentation and sale of security in Bankers Life).
102. See id. at 1028-29 (distinguishing degree of connection in Ketchum from
that in Bankers Life and holding that there must be close connection between
fraudulent misrepresentation and sale or purchase of security).
103. See id. at 1027-28 ("It would appear, then, that the present case does not
constitute an instance in which misrepresentations were tendered 'in connection
with' a securities transaction. To the contrary, the purportedly deceptive practices
occurred, if at all, in connection with the struggle for control of the
corporation.").
104. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2000)
(summarizing essential points of Ketchum and Ketchum's role in Third Circuit Court
of Appeals' case law relating to "in connection with" requirement of Section 10
and Rule lOb-5).
105. 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1985).
106. Id. at 941.
107. See id. at 942-45 (discussing defendants' arguments against Section 10
and Rule lOb-5 liability and responding to such arguments by discussing numerous
factual situations in which Section 10 and Rule lOb-5 have been applied).
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The Third Circuit found that the defendants' misrepresentations and
nondisclosures satisfied Rule lOb-5's requisite causal connection per
Ketchum. l08 Further, the court justified its holding by taking exception to
the straight-forward "investment value" approach, specifically noting that
"Rule lOb-5 also encompasses misrepresentations beyond those implicat-
ing the investment value of a particular security" and, therefore, includes
misrepresentations related to a broader course of dealing in securities. 109
The court qualified its broad holding, however, by reinforcing the impor-
tance of considering the "in connection with" requirement on a case-by-
case basis. 110 Notwithstanding the court's caution, Angelastro indicates
that the Third Circuit will view Rule lOb-5 broadly when the circumstances
warrant such an interpretation."I '
B. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.
1. Facts and Procedural History
In March of 1998, Cendant Corporation executed an agreement to
purchase American Bankers Insurance Group (ABI) for approximately
$3.1 billion, payable partly in cash and partly in Cendant stock." 2 On
April 15, 1998, Cendant publicly announced that it had discovered certain
accounting irregularities and that it would therefore have to restate its an-
nual and quarterly earning for the 1997 fiscal year.1 13 In the wake of this
announcement, the price of ABI common stock dropped from $64 and 7/
8 per share to $57 and 3/4 per share. 114
Despite such findings, Cendant publicly reaffirmed its commitment to
completing the merger with ABI. 115 On July 14, 1998, however, Cendant
108. See id. at 944 ("[Plaintiff] has pleaded a sufficient causal connection be-
tween the purported fraudulent concealment and [plaintiffs'] purchase of securi-
ties on margin to meet the 'in connection with' requirement of Section 10b.").
109. See id. at 942 (expanding scope of "investment value" approach).
110. See id. at 944 (citing Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1027 (3d Cir. 1977)
(noting that courts should adopt case-by-case approach for determining proper
scope of "in connection with" requirement in order to avoid potential "overexten-
sions" of Section 10).
111. See id. at 945 (noting that "[i]n keeping with the Supreme Court's state-
ment that the 'in connection with' language be read broadly, many courts have
found the requisite causal nexus in situations involving the course of dealing in
securities" and, further, finding such nexus).
112. See id. at 170 (discussing facts of case).
113. See id. (discussing facts of case). Cendant reported that the "irregulari-
ties occurred in a single business unit that 'accounted for less than one third' of
Cendant's net income." Id. Cendant also announced that as a result of the poten-
tial accounting irregularities, "its Audit Committee had engaged Willkie, Farr &
Gallagher and Arthur Andersen LLP to perform an independent investigation."
See id. (discussing Cendant's actions after discovering accounting irregularities).
114. See id. (noting eleven percent decrease in price of ABI common stock
after April 15 announcement).
115. See id. (describing Cendant's reassuring announcements). One such an-
nouncement occurred on April 27, 1998, when Cendant's chairman of the board
and its chief executive officer issued a letter to Cendant shareholders. See id.
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made a series of additional statements describing the company's progres-
sively worsening financial situation and stated that the company's previous
announcements were inaccurate as to the anticipated reduction of in-
come. 116 After the July 14, 1998 announcement, the price of ABI stock
further dropped until Cendant again publicly reaffirmed its intention to
continue the tender offer. 117 Cendant's continued announcements re-
garding its intent to go forward with the merger, served to "buoy" the
price of ABI common stock." 18
On August 13, 1998, Cendant announced the completion of its inves-
tigation into the company's accounting irregularities. 119 In a press re-
lease, Cendant stated that it "would restate its earnings by $0.28 per share
in 1997, $0.19 per share in 1996, and by $0.14 per share in 1995."120
On September 29, 1998, Cendant announced that it had in fact lost
$217.2 million in 1997, rather than earning the previously stated $55.5
million. 2 1 In response to Cendant's announcement, AGI common stock
then dropped to $43.00 per share.' 22 On October 13, 1998, Cendant and
(elaborating upon specifics of announcements). The letter was published in the
financial press and stated:
. We are outraged that the apparent misdeeds of a small number of
individuals within a limited part of our company has adversely affected
the value of your investment-and ours-in Cendant. We are working
together diligently to clear this matter up as soon as possible. We fully
support the Audit Committee's investigation and continue to believe that
the strategic rationale and industrial logic of the ... merger that created
Cendant is as compelling as ever.
Cendant is strong, highly liquid, and'extremely profitable. The vast
majority of Cendant's operating businesses and earnings are unaffected
and the prospects for the Company's future growth and success are
excellent.
We have reaffirmed our commitment to completing all pending ac-
quisitions, [including] American Bankers ....
Id.
Further, Cendant issued a press release on May 5, 1998, stating that "'over
eighty percent of the Company's net income for the first quarter of 1988 came
from Cendant business units not impacted by the potential accounting irregulari-
ties."' Id. at 170-71.
116. See id. at 171 (noting disclosure that "reduction in income would be
twice as much as previously announced").
117. See id. (discussing impact of disclosure upon ABI stock price). Further,
during the Audit Committee's investigation, the Audit Committee discovered sev-
eral accounting irregularities not previously disclosed. See id. at 171 (discussing
accounting irregularities and finding that such irregularities spanned over busi-
ness units and fiscal years).
118. See id. (discussing effect of Cendant's announcement of commitment to
continue tender offer on ABI's stock price).
119. See id. (discussing Cendant's announcement of completion of investiga-
tion, as announced in press release).
120. Id.
121. See id. (discussing further announcements of accounting irregularities).
122. See id. at 171 (elaborating further on adverse effect Cendant's announce-
ments had on price of ABI common stock).
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ABI terminated the merger agreement and Cendant subsequently paid
ABI a $400 million breakup fee. 123 In response to the agreement's termi-
nation, the price of ABI common stock dropped to $35 and 1/2 per
share. 124
On October 14, 1998, plaintiffs, P. Schoenfeld Asset Management
LLC and a class of similarly situated investors (collectively "the Class"),
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey under Section 10b and Rule lOb-5.1 25 The complaint alleged that
Cendant and certain individual defendants made fraudulent misrepresen-
tations in public statements regarding "Cendant's financial condition, its
willingness to complete the tender offer, and its willingness to complete
the proposed merger." 12 6 According to the Class, these announcements
artificially inflated the price of ABI common stock.127 As a result, the
Class allegedly suffered harm when the inflated price of ABI stock crashed
in response to Cendant's public disclosure of the accounting irregularities,
the misrepresentations regarding the completion of the merger and the
ultimate termination of the merger agreement. 128
In response to the Class' complaint, defendants filed, and the District
Court for the District of NewJersey granted, a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 129 The Class
appealed the district court's decision. 13 0 The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, on review, did not decide whether the alleged misrepresentations
were "in connection with" the purchase of ABI common stock; rather, the
court clarified the standard to determine whether such connection was
present.13 1 Having clarified that standard, the court remanded the case to
the district court for further proceedings concerning the materiality and
123. See id. (discussing announcement of termination of merger agreement).
124. See id. (discussing ultimate impact of termination of Cendant and ABI's
merger agreement upon ABI stock price).
125. See id. at 169,171 (discussing procedural posture of case). The "similarly
situated investors" included "persons who purchased shares of ABI common stock
during the course of the tender offer." See id. at 169 (adding that class period ran
from January 27, 1998 to October 13, 1998). The Class alleged that it was harmed
by purchasing ABI common stock at an artificially inflated price and then suffering
a corresponding loss when Cendant disclosed the misrepresentations to the public
and the merger agreement was terminated. See id. at 169 (discussing plaintiffs'
allegation that Cendant's misrepresentations artificially inflated price of ABI
stock). For a discussion of the fluctuating price of ABI common stock during the
class period, see infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
126. See id. at 171 (discussing Class' allegations). In addition to Cendant, the
defendants to the action included Cendant's former officers, directors and its ac-
countant. See id. at 169 (identifying defendants).
127. See id. (discussing Class' allegations).
128. See id. (discussing Class' allegations).
129. See id. at 172 (finding, inter alia, "that the complaint failed to establish
that the alleged misrepresentations were made 'in connection with' the Class's
purchases of ABI common stock").
130. See id. at 169 (discussing Class' appeal).
131. See id. at 177-78 (discussing limited nature of holding). The court stated:
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18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss5/6
2002] ' CASEBRIEF 1189
public dissemination of Cendant's alleged misrepresentations, in accor-
dance with the pronounced materiality and public dissemination
approach.
132
2. Defining the Contours of the "In Connection With" Requirement in the
Context of Public Misrepresentations
In reversing and remanding the district court's opinion, the Third
Circuit began its analysis by reviewing the circuit's prior cases addressing
the "in connection with" requirement. 133 From this review, specifically of
Ketchum and Angelastro, the court distilled the two principal mainstays of
the Third Circuit's "in connection with" jurisprudence. 3 4 These princi-
ples are Ketchum's requirement that the "'in connection with' language
requires a casual connection between the claimed fraud and the purchase
or the sale of a security," and the Angelastro court's finding that the "mis-
representations need not refer to a particular security."1 35
Ketchum and Angelastro, however, were factually dissimilar sittiations,
each having been based on alleged Rule lOb-5 violations involving private
misrepresentations. 13 6 In contrast, the alleged violations in Semerenko con-
cerned the issuance of false and misleading information to the public at
large. 1 37 Due to these factual dissimilarities, the Semerenko court was
forced to look to the Second and Ninth Circuits for guidance on this issue
of first impression in the Third Circuit.13 8
We do not resolve, however, whether the "in connection with" require-
ment is satisfied in the present case. Because the standard that we have
set forth is different from the one applied by the district court, and be-
cause the parties have not been afforded a full opportunity to brief the
issues of materiality and public dissemination, we will remand this matter
to allow the district court to consider, in the first instance, the question
whether the Class's [sic] complaint pleads sufficient facts to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 12(b)(6).
Id.
132. See id. at (noting that "the issue of materiality typically presents a mixed
question of law and fact; and that the delicate assessment of inferences is generally
best left to the trier of fact").
133. See id. at 174-75, 176 n.5 (discussing facts and holdings of Ketchum and
Angelastro, as well as relevance of Gottlieb in Third Circuit jurisprudence).
134. See id. at 175 (noting two points that Ketchum and Angelastro illustrate).
135. See id. ([T]he decisions in Ketchum and Angelastro are illustrative of the
point that the 'in connection with' language requires a casual connection between
the claimed fraud and the purchase or the sale of a security, and that the misrepre-
sentations need not refer to a particular security .... ).
136. See id. (noting that Ketchum presented "a claim based on allegations of
internal corporate misconduct arising from a contest for the control of a closely
held corporation" and that Angelastro "concern [ed] a fraudulent course of dealing
by a brokerage firm").
137. See id. (stating that Semerenko "involves the publicdissemination of alleg-
edly misleading information into an efficient securities market").
138. See id. ("In light of the law of this circuit that the scope of the 'in con-
nection with' requirement must be determined on a case-by-case basis, we are com-
pelled to look elsewhere in deciding the standard that governs this matter.").
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The Third Circuit based its holding on the broad "reasonably calcu-
lated" standard set forth in both the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals. 13 9 Furthermore, the court included in its approach an element
of materiality, holding that the "class may establish the 'in connection
with' element simply by showing that the misrepresentations in question
were disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a reasonable
investor would rely, and that they were material." 140 Further, under this
standard, the court held that the Class of investors "is not required to es-
tablish that the defendants actually envisioned that members of the class
would rely upon the alleged misrepresentations when making their invest-
ment decisions. Rather, it must only show that the alleged misrepresenta-
tions were reckless." 1
4 1
In so holding, the Third Circuit provided a broad interpretation of
Rule lOb-5's "in connection with" requirement. 14 2 The court found that
this broad holding was justified given that the purpose underlying Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is "to ensure that investors obtain fair and full disclo-
sure of material facts in connection with their decisions to purchase or sell
securities." 1 43 According to the court, "[t] hat purpose is best satisfied by a
rule that recognizes the realistic causal effect that material misrepresenta-
139. See id. at 176 (citing In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953,
966 (2d Cir. 1993). The court relied on the Second Circuit's decision in In reAmes
Department Stores, Inc. Stock Litigation, where the Second Circuit applied the Texas
Gulf"reasonably calculated" standard to a case "involving the public dissemination
of false information in publicly filed offering documents, press releases and re-
search reports." Id. The Semerenko court also relied on McGann v. Ernst & Young, a
case in which the Ninth Circuit found that dissemination of false information in a
publicly filed annual report satisfied rule 10b-5's "in connection with" requirement
per Texas Guf. See McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996)
(adopting standards articulated in Texas Gu/).
140. See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176 (adopting public dissemination approach
of Second and Ninth Circuit based on standard articulated in Texas Gul). The
court also revisited its holding in Gottlieb, using that precedent to support its reli-
ance on the standards articulated in Texas Gulf See id. at 176 n.5 (citing Gottlieb v.
Sandia American Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 515-16 (3d Cir. 1971)). According to one
commentator, however:
The addition of the element of "materiality" to the element of "dissemi-
nation to the public in a medium upon which a reasonable investor
would rely" to satisfy the "in connection with" requirement may be more
semantic than substantive because the materiality of the misrepresenta-
tion is sine qua non of a 10b-5 violation whether it is viewed separately, or
as a part of the "in connection with" requirement.
Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Rule lOb-5's "In Connection With".- A Nexus
for Securities Fraud, 57 Bus. LAW. 1, 6 (2001).
141. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176 (citations omitted) (citing In re Advanta Corp.
Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc. Stock Litig.,
991 F.2d 953, 965 (2d Cir. 1993)).
142. See Duffy, supra note 13, at B5 (stating that Third Circuit adopted "broad
reading of securities fraud laws"); McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 1 (labeling Third
Circuit's interpretation of "in connection with" requirement as "expansive").
143. See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Angelastro v. Pruden-
tial-Bache Sec., Inc. 764 F.2d 939, 942 (3d Cir. 1985)).
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tions, which raise the public's interest in particular securities, tend to have
on the investment decisions of market participants who trade in those se-
curities." 144 As the Second Circuit noted in In re Ames Department Stores,
Inc.,1 45 "It] he securities markets are highly sensitive to press releases and
to information contained in all sorts of publicly released corporate docu-
ments, and the investor is foolish who would ignore such releases. 1 46
Therefore, this broad approach, unlike the narrower private misrepresen-
tation approaches, is necessary in public disclosure cases given the sensitiv-
ity of securities markets.' 4 7
V. A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS ON RULE 1OB-5'S
"IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT
Although Rule 10b-5's "in connection with" requirement is the source
of much confusion among the lower courts, such confusion can be a key
advantage for practitioners in the Third Circuit seeking to sustain a Rule
10b-5 action. 148 Working under minimal guidance from the United States
Supreme Court, the lower courts have sought to define the contours of the
"in connection with" requirement in a manner that provides certainty, yet
preserves flexibility to meet unusual circumstances. 149 Such efforts have
led to both "broad" and "stringent" interpretations of the nexus needed to
meet Rule 10b-5's "in connection with" requirement.' 5 0
Practitioners in the Third Circuit have the somewhat dubious advan-
tage of the rule's ambiguity in formulating an argument either for an ex-
pansive interpretation of the "in connection with" requirement or,
conversely, a stringent interpretation.15 1 Practitioners seeking to bring
and sustain a Rule 10b-5 action, in particular, must utilize the ambiguity
144. See id. at 176 (citing In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953,
966 (2d Cir. 1993).
145. 991 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1993).
146. Id. at 963 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
147. See id. (discussing effect of misleading press release on securities
markets).
148. For a discussion of the confusion prevalent in the lower courts, see supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
149. See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 1 (discussing courts' struggle in inter-
preting "in connection with" requirement).
150. See Black, supra note 5, at 540 (citing United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d
1024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1986) as authority for "broad" interpretation and Crummere v.
Smith Barney, 624 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) as authority for "stringent"
interpretation).
151. For a further discussion of the stringent interpretations, see supra note
159 and accompanying text. Practitioners arguing for a stringent interpretation in
the context of private misrepresentations must argue that Ketchum's causation re-
quirement is not met and therefore that the alleged misrepresentation is not "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of the security. See Ketchum v. Green, 557
F.2d 1022, 1027-29 (3d Cir. 1977) (adopting causation limitation). This standard
leaves room for some creative argument, as the Ketchum court did not specifically
define the degree of causation required. See id. at 1027-29 (noting only that less
attenuated degree of causation was required than was present in Ketchum).
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present in the Rule's construction to their advantage in order to withstand
a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss.' 52 Further, these practitioners should
try to take advantage of the Third Circuit's willingness to look outside of
its own precedents to those of other circuits.' 53
For Third Circuit corporate practitioners and their corporate clients,
Semerenko represents a cautionary warning. As experience in the Second
Circuit indicates, the materiality and public dissemination approach "casts
a wide net, particularly at the pleading stage."1 54 This "wide net" under-
scores the importance of "meticulous care and investigation attending the
preparation and issuance of any public statements made by directors and
officers," including press releases, letters to shareholders, quarterly reports
and annual reports.15 5 Although such meticulous care may or may not be
enough to avoid a private party's claim under Rule 10b-5, it may be
enough to invoke the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, which in turn renders
the plaintiffs claim regarding misleading forward-looking statements moot
for lack of materiality.
156
Semerenko's "wide net" in cases regarding the dissemination of false
and misleading information to the public, however, might not aid a practi-
tioner in bringing a Rule 10b-5 claim concerning a private misrepresenta-
tion.157 In such cases, Third Circuit practitioners must continue to rely on
152. For a further discussion of Rule lOb-5's requirement regarding the
nexus litigants must show between the prohibited act and the purchase of sale of a
security in order to pursue an action under Rule lOb-5, see supra note 5 and ac-
companying text.
153. See, e.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 175-80 (3d Cir.
2000) (rejecting previous Third Circuit precedent in factual situation at bar and
instead looking to Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit for applicable precedent).
154. See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 1 (discussing effect of Second Circuit's
expansive interpretation of "in connection with" requirement and advocating in-
stead "investment value" approach).
155. See id. (noting importance of "meticulous care and investigation" when
preparing public documents).
156. See EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 809 (discussing "bespeaks caution" doc-
trine. Not every misleading statement, gives rise to Rule lOb-5 liability. Id. The
"bespeaks caution" doctrine allows a defendant to escape liability under Section
10b and Rule lOb-5 notwithstanding the issuance of a misleading statement. Id.
Courts afford this defense only if the document containing the misleading for-
ward-looking statement includes sufficient cautionary language. Id.
In 1995 Congress codified this safe harbor in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("Reform Act"). See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(i) (1) (2000) (provid-
ing statutory safe harbor for forward-looking oral or written statements); see also EP
Medsystems, Inc. v. Echocath, Inc. 235 F.3d 865,872 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing
Reform Act's purpose).
157. See Semerenko, at 175-80 (distinguishing case based on fact that situation
involved public misrepresentations). The Semerenko court stated:
We conclude that the materiality and public dissemination approach
should apply in this case. The purpose underlying § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
is to ensure that investors obtain fair and full disclosure of material facts
in connection with their decisions to purchase or sell securities. That pur-
pose is best satisfied by a rule that recognizes the realistic causal effect
that material misrepresentations, which raise the public's interest in par-
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Ketchum's causation approach or Angelastro's more liberal quasi-investment
value approach.15 8 If neither case is factually similar to the practitioner's
case at bar, however, the practitioner again should not hesitate to look to
the precedent of other circuits.1 59
V. CONCLUSION
Commentators suggest that Semerenko announced a "new rule on
shareholder lawsuits" 160 or "dispelled much of the confusion in its juris-
diction." 16 1 To the contrary, however, Semerenko can be viewed as falling
neatly into the general tendency shared between the circuits in cases con-
cerning public dissemination of fraudulent misrepresentations, as the
court held that the "in connection" requirement is met when the affirma-
tive misrepresentations are material and made in a setting reasonably cal-
culated or reasonably expected to influence the investing public. 162 The
confusion invoked by the Rule's ambiguity, however, is still very much
alive in and between all the circuits, specifically in cases of private misrep-
resentations. 163 Indeed, this confusion is the only constant in defining the
contours of the "in connection with" requirement. As such, practitioners
arguing before the Third Circuit must utilize the leeway this confusion
provides to their utmost advantage. 164
Anna Mae Maloney
ticular securities, tend to have on the investment decisions of market par-
ticipants who trade in those securities.
Id. at 176 (citations omitted).
The court further noted that, "[i] n light of the law of this circuit.., the scope
of the 'in connection with' requirement must be determined on a case-by-case
basis .... Id. at 175.
158. For a discussion of Ketchum, see supra notes 95-105 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Angelastro, see supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
159. See Semenrenko, 223 F.3d at 175-76 (rejecting previous Third Circuit pre-
cedent as useful in factual situation at bar and looking instead to useful precedent
in Second and Ninth Circuits).
160. See Duffy, supra note 13, at B5 (suggesting that Semerenko announced
"new rule on shareholder lawsuits").
161. See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 1 (suggesting that Semerenko decision
serves to "dispel much confusion in its jurisdiction").
162. For a further discussion of the consistency found throughout the lower
courts regarding public misrepresentations made "in connection with" the sale or
purchase of a security, see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
163. For a further discussion of the confusion prevalent among the lower
courts, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
164. For a further discussion of how practitioners must use the confusion
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